Identity systems determine who can access an organisation’s devices, applications, files, cloud platforms, and administrative tools. In many Windows environments, Active Directory Domain Services sits at the centre of this access. It manages users, computers, groups, policies, service accounts, and trust relationships across the business.

This concentration of control makes identity infrastructure a high-value target. An attacker who compromises a privileged account may not need to exploit every server individually. They may be able to use legitimate permissions to access sensitive data, change security policies, create accounts, or take control of connected systems.

Active Directory and identity VAPT examines whether weaknesses in accounts, permissions, authentication protocols, delegation, and administrative practices could allow this to happen. The assessment focuses on how attackers could move from limited access to control of the identity environment, and what that level of access would mean for the wider business.

Why Active Directory Is Often the Real Target?

Attackers may initially enter through a phishing email, vulnerable workstation, exposed remote service, or compromised password. However, their longer-term objective is often to obtain more powerful identity privileges.

Active Directory provides authentication and authorisation across many connected systems. Domain controllers also store and process information that supports user and computer authentication.

Microsoft warns that credential theft and privileged access can allow attackers to expand control across an Active Directory environment, particularly when administrative accounts sign in to less secure devices or receive broader access than necessary.

This means an initial compromise can become much more serious when identity controls are weak.

An internal network assessment may show how an attacker reaches systems inside the business. Active Directory VAPT goes deeper into whether accounts, group memberships, trust relationships, and authentication mechanisms can then be abused to gain greater control.

What Active Directory and Identity VAPT Should Examine

The assessment should reflect the organisation’s domain structure, administrative model, connected applications, hybrid services, and business-critical accounts.

Testing may examine:

  • Domain, forest, organisational unit, group, and trust configurations
  • Membership of privileged and delegated administration groups
  • User, computer, service, shared, emergency, and inactive accounts
  • Password policies, lockout settings, multifactor authentication, and authentication restrictions
  • Kerberos service principal names, ticket settings, delegation, and encryption types
  • NTLM use, LDAP signing, channel binding, and legacy authentication dependencies
  • Group Policy permissions, scripts, software deployment, and security settings
  • Access control lists applied to directory objects, groups, and organisational units
  • Domain controller access, administration paths, backups, and recovery permissions
  • Certificate-based authentication and Active Directory Certificate Services
  • Directory synchronisation, federation, cloud roles, and hybrid identity connections

The assessment should not simply count privileged accounts or list configuration settings. It should determine whether a realistic path exists from an ordinary or compromised account to sensitive identity privileges.

Common Identity Weaknesses and Their Impact

Identity attack paths often combine several individually overlooked issues. A stale account may have access to a server, that server may expose a service account, and the service account may have permission to change a privileged group.

Identity weakness Possible attacker action Potential business impact
Excessive privileged group membership Use an unnecessary administrator account to change directory-wide controls Domain compromise and widespread unauthorised access
Weak service account security Recover or crack credentials linked to a valuable service Access to applications, servers, or privileged functions
Unsafe delegation Impersonate users when accessing connected services Credential misuse and movement between systems
Weak directory permissions Modify a group, account, policy, or authentication setting Privilege escalation and persistent access
Legacy authentication Capture, relay, or reuse weaker authentication material Account compromise and unauthorised system access
Stale or unmanaged accounts Use forgotten credentials that remain active Undetected access with limited accountability
Hybrid identity misconfiguration Move between on-premises and cloud identity environments Compromise of cloud data, applications, or administration

Excessive Privileged Access

Groups such as Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins can provide extensive control over the directory environment.

Membership should therefore remain tightly restricted. Privileged accounts should not be used for email, web browsing, or ordinary daily work because compromise of a lower-trust device can expose high-value credentials.

Microsoft recommends limiting highly privileged group membership to a small number of responsible administrators and delegating narrower permissions for routine tasks.

Testing should also look beyond obvious administrator groups. Nested memberships, delegated permissions, object ownership, backup rights, and the ability to modify Group Policy can create indirect routes to the same level of control.

Service Accounts and Kerberos Exposure

Service accounts allow applications, scheduled tasks, and background services to access local or network resources.

These accounts are often configured once and then left unchanged for years. They may use static passwords, hold unnecessary privileges, or run across several servers.

Some Kerberos attacks target service accounts associated with service principal names. Attackers may request service tickets and attempt to recover weak service account passwords offline.

The risk increases when passwords are predictable, rarely changed, or shared across services. Microsoft advises against placing service accounts in privileged groups because inherited privileges increase the potential impact of compromise.

An assessment should identify whether managed service accounts, strong credential controls, and restricted permissions could reduce this exposure.

Delegation and Impersonation Risks

Kerberos delegation allows one service to access another resource on behalf of a user. This supports legitimate workflows, but unsafe configurations may allow a compromised service to impersonate users across additional systems.

Unconstrained delegation creates particular concern because it may expose reusable authentication material on delegated systems. Constrained and resource-based delegation can also create attack paths when permissions are assigned too broadly.

Sensitive administrative accounts should be protected from delegation. Microsoft recommends marking sensitive accounts so they cannot be delegated, reducing the risk that their credentials are reused through trusted services.

Testing should establish which computers and accounts can delegate, what services they can reach, and whether an attacker could alter those relationships.

Weak Object Permissions and Group Policy Control

Active Directory permissions are not limited to signing in or joining an administrator group.

An account may be allowed to reset another user’s password, add members to a group, modify a service principal name, change a computer object, or edit a Group Policy Object.

These permissions may have been delegated for legitimate support work but become dangerous when they apply too broadly.

Group Policy is especially important because it can configure computers and users across large parts of the environment. An account that can modify a policy linked to servers or administrator devices may be able to deploy code, change security settings, or create persistent access.

Active Directory VAPT maps these relationships to identify indirect privilege paths that are difficult to see through manual group reviews alone.

Legacy Protocols Can Undermine Strong Passwords

Strong passwords do not prevent every identity attack. The authentication protocol and the way systems exchange credentials also matter.

Kerberos is the preferred authentication method in Active Directory environments, but older applications and devices may continue to rely on NTLM.

Legacy dependencies can make captured or relayed authentication more useful to attackers. Organisations should understand where older protocols remain in use before restricting them, as immediate enforcement may disrupt business applications.

LDAP security also requires attention. LDAP signing protects the integrity of directory communications, while channel binding helps prevent encrypted sessions from being hijacked or redirected. Microsoft recommends monitoring compatibility and moving toward stronger enforcement where supported.

Identity VAPT can identify unsafe authentication paths and show which systems prevent the organisation from retiring weaker protocols.

The Connection Between Endpoints and Identity Compromise

Privileged credentials are often exposed on the devices where administrators use them.

A compromised workstation may contain password material, authentication tickets, browser sessions, remote management credentials, or active administrative sessions.

This creates a direct connection between workstation security weaknesses and identity compromise. A hardened domain controller provides limited protection if highly privileged accounts regularly sign in to poorly controlled devices.

Testing should examine where privileged users authenticate, whether administrative tasks use separate accounts, and whether lower-trust systems can interact with higher-trust identities.

The assessment may also test whether a compromised standard account can discover administrator sessions, access identity management tools, or reach systems that store more valuable credentials.

Hybrid Identity Expands the Trust Boundary

Many organisations synchronise on-premises Active Directory accounts with Microsoft Entra ID or use federation to connect local identities with cloud services.

This provides a consistent user experience, but it also connects two security environments. A weakness in directory synchronisation, federation, cloud role assignment, or privileged account management may allow compromise to spread across that boundary.

Microsoft recommends separating ordinary and privileged administrator accounts, using multifactor authentication for privileged access, and maintaining emergency access accounts for Microsoft Entra environments.

Legacy cloud authentication also creates risk because it may not support modern controls such as multifactor authentication. Microsoft recommends blocking legacy authentication through Conditional Access after assessing operational dependencies.

Identity testing should coordinate with a review of the surrounding cloud controls when synchronisation services, cloud roles, applications, and conditional access policies affect the attack path.

When Businesses Should Prioritise Identity VAPT?

Active Directory and identity testing becomes particularly important when an organisation:

  • Has a large or long-established Windows domain
  • Uses hybrid identity or synchronises accounts with cloud services
  • Grants administrative access to several internal teams or suppliers
  • Relies on numerous service accounts and scheduled processes
  • Has inherited domains, trusts, or accounts through a merger or acquisition
  • Uses older applications that depend on NTLM or unsigned LDAP
  • Experiences credential theft, ransomware, suspicious sign-ins, or privilege misuse
  • Has not reviewed delegated permissions and privileged groups for several years

Testing should also follow major identity migrations, domain restructuring, new federation arrangements, or changes to privileged access management.

Final Thoughts: Identity Control Defines the Impact of a Breach

An attacker may enter through one user, device, or application, but weak identity controls can determine how far that compromise spreads. Excessive privileges, exposed service accounts, unsafe delegation, legacy authentication, and hidden permission paths can turn limited access into control over the wider environment. Active Directory VAPT helps organisations identify these routes before attackers use them. It shows which accounts and relationships create genuine privilege escalation opportunities and where stronger separation could contain an incident.

Aegixis VAPT Services can assess on-premises Active Directory, hybrid identity, privileged access, service accounts, Kerberos configuration, directory permissions, Group Policy, legacy protocols, and connected identity services. By combining configuration review with controlled attack-path validation, Aegixis helps organisations protect the identity systems that control access to their most important business assets.

Active Directory and Identity VAPT FAQs

What is Active Directory VAPT?

Active Directory VAPT is a security assessment that examines whether weaknesses in accounts, groups, permissions, authentication protocols, delegation, and directory configuration could allow unauthorised access or privilege escalation.

Is Active Directory VAPT the same as internal network VAPT?

No. Internal network VAPT examines a wider range of systems and network attack paths. Active Directory VAPT focuses specifically on identity relationships, directory permissions, authentication mechanisms, and routes to privileged control.

Can Active Directory testing disrupt business systems?

Testing can be performed safely when the scope and permitted techniques are agreed in advance. Potentially disruptive actions, such as changing production policies or privileged group memberships, should normally be demonstrated through controlled evidence rather than applied directly.